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Abstract
We study the security challenges that arise in people-centric urban sensing, a new
sensor-networking paradigm that leverages humans as part of the sensing infrastruc-
ture. Most prior work on sensor networks has focused on collecting and processing
ephemeral data about the environment using a static topology and an application-aware
infrastructure. People-centric urban sensing, however, involves collecting, storing, pro-
cessing and fusing large volumes of data related to every-day human activities. Sensing
is performed in a highly dynamic and mobile environment, and supports (among other
things) pervasive computing applications that are focused on enhancing the user’s expe-
rience. In such a setting, where humans are the central focus, there are new challenges
for information security; not only because of the complex and dynamic communica-
tion patterns, but also because the data originates from sensors that are carried by a
person—not a tiny sensor thrown in the forest or mounted on the neck of an animal.
In this paper we aim to instigate discussion about this critical issue—because people-
centric sensing will never succeed without adequate provisions for security and privacy.
To that end, we outline several important challenges and suggest general solutions that
hold promise in this new paradigm of sensor networks.
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(I3P) under an award from the Science and Technology Directorate at the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the authors and do not represent the official
position or policies of the United States Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Commerce, or the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
1 Introduction
Sensor networks provide tremendous potential for information collection and processing in
a variety of application domains. The first generation of sensor-network scenarios include
stationary devices sensing ephemeral features of the environment around them. In this paper
we focus on a new generation of sensor networks, those aimed at everyday applications in
daily life and at the use of “people-centric” devices in dense urban environments. People-
centric urban sensing has been introduced [6] as a term that describes this new paradigm:
small computational devices, carried by individuals in their daily activities, sense information
directly or indirectly related to human activity, as well as aspects of the environment around
them.
This new kind of sensor network is based on a different set of assumptions and trade-
offs than in much of the prior work on sensor networks, requiring new thinking about the
communications infrastructure. Likewise, these new capabilities and architectures create
new needs and require new solutions for information security. First, the likely applications
deal with highly sensitive or private information, requiring a deeper attention to privacy and
anonymity than in most prior work. Second, different assumptions about device and network
capabilities (including high mobility, opportunistic networking, strong but not continuous
connectivity, and relatively plentiful power) lead to different opportunities for sensor-network
architecture and push different security solutions. For example, previous work has focused
on security solutions for resource-constrained devices [44, 65], secure routing techniques
for static sensor networks [11, 34, 64] and secure data collection and aggregation in static
and fixed tree topologies [8, 47]. Furthermore, since sensors could fall into the hands of
adversaries, attention was paid to secure key management and distribution schemes that
could tolerate compromise [28, 30, 63]. Given the trend toward urban-sensing applications
and the potential for people-centric sensors, the time is ripe to explore new security and
privacy challenges. In this setting, sensor devices will (i) be highly mobile, so existing security
solutions that assume fixed topologies cannot be employed; (ii) have limited resources, but
not severely so; thus new cryptographic techniques can be employed (e.g., we may assume
that public-key cryptography will not significantly degrade a sensor node’s lifetime [46]);
and, critically, (iii) most sensors will be carried by people, thus introducing critical privacy
concerns as well as new adversarial threat models.
This paper contributes to the discussion by surveying these security and privacy chal-
lenges, and identifying some key solution concepts. We hope this work will instigate further
work on this critical topic.
In Section 2 we overview urban sensing and identify the key features and assumptions
driving a need for new solutions. We discuss the applications enabled by this form of sensor
network in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe what we believe to be the new challenges
and discuss some conceptual solutions. We summarize the paper in Section 5.
2 Urban Sensing
Wireless sensor networks provide a structure for gathering data on scales and in environ-
ments previously unattainable. In 2002, the Great Duck Island Experiment [40] successfully
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demonstrated both of these characteristics by dropping a large number of small wireless
sensors on a remote island to study the nesting habits of the Leach’s Storm Petrel seabird.
Other projects followed, such as the Macroscope in the Redwoods [51] and a counter-sniper
system [49], which continued to demonstrate the viability of the field.
Forests and battlegrounds, however, are not the only interestingly “sensable” locales:
new research is proceeding on sensing in urban environments. These environments present
a potentially much larger coverage area than a single redwood tree, or even a 237-acre
island. This larger coverage area carries with it more challenges, such as the necessity for
more (or more powerful) sensors; interference from architectural features and competing
radio sources; vulnerability of sensors to human adversaries; replacing batteries or sensors in
hard-to-reach places; and modifying or augmenting the deployed sensors as new technology
becomes available.
Static to mobile. An emerging area of research within the field of sensor networks focuses
on using mobility to address the challenges associated with urban sensing. These mobile
sensor networks differ from static sensor networks in many ways, and as we investigate the
security of such systems, we have made some assumptions related to these differences.
Our initial assumption is that sensors are mobile and “people-centric”; that is, sensing
not only the surrounding environment, but also people themselves. These sensors will be
carried by people, either directly or in their vehicles, and therefore are conceptually tied to
specific individuals. We envision sensors being built into devices such as cell phones, which
are more powerful than traditional “mote” sensors and can be conveniently recharged on a
daily basis, thus mitigating the extreme compute and energy constraints. We assume (for
now) participation under a single administrative domain, and support from a public key
infrastructure (PKI) or similar system to assert identity and attributes. Network availability
and bandwidth—Wi-Fi and cellular—is much better in an urban environment than in the
middle of a forest. Applications enabled by these systems will be directly and immediately
relevant to users, and we assume that they will be willing to participate in such large-
scale applications, adopting opportunistic practices for sensing and networking, for instance
allowing their sensors to be remotely tasked on someone else’s behalf. But we also make
a few non-assumptions. Namely, we do not assume that the network infrastructure can be
trusted, nor do we assume that sensors are tamper-proof or that users will not attempt to
hack them. Similarly, we do not assume that sensors are always available, or never fail.
People-centric urban sensing has already been a topic of study in the community. We
next overview two specific research projects along this direction, often used as points of
reference in our exposition.
CarTel. The CarTel project [29] uses small Linux-based computers installed in vehicles to
map traffic patterns in Boston and Seattle. The computer contains sensors of its own (e.g.,
GPS) and attaches to the vehicle’s on-board diagnostic (OBD) interface to measure loca-
tion, direction, speed, acceleration, and other relevant parameters. CarTel’s delay-tolerant
networking stack, CafNet, takes advantage of randomly-encountered unrestricted wireless
access points to upload sensed data to a relational database on the Internet. A web-based
user interface provides access to the database, and allows for modification of data-gathering
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rules, such as time granularity. Applications enabled by the CarTel project include traf-
fic monitoring, automotive diagnostics and notification, and road-surface diagnostics. Note
that these applications are people-centric: the producers of the data are ordinary people (in
their cars), and the consumers of this data are also ordinary users, not specialized scientists
studying the environment.
MetroSense. Similarly, MetroSense [6] envisions a future in which the Internet is domi-
nated by data from sensors carried by people around the world. The architecture is divided
into three tiers: servers, sensor access points (SAPs), and the sensors themselves. Servers
possess effectively unbounded storage and computing power, and are responsible for man-
aging a MetroSense domain, including tasking of sensor devices, storing data, and running
applications. The SAPs provide a gateway between sensors and servers, in addition to sens-
ing their own environment and disseminating tasks to sensor nodes. The sensor tier consists
of mobile sensors (MS) and static sensors (SS), both of which participate in the sensing
of the world, and of the sensor’s custodian. Some applications include BikeNet [17] and
SkiScape [16], intended as sample studies to motivate the development of the MetroSense
infrastructure.
Security in the mobile paradigm. As the sensor network field widens to include mo-
bility in an urban environment, new security challenges are appearing. Additionally, some
requirements of traditional networks are less important in the mobile, urban context, thus
opening up new potential solutions.
One interesting side-effect of the shift to mobile sensing is that multi-hop routing seems
less necessary. Through their experiments, the CarTel project revealed the existence of more
than enough open wireless access points to allow the uploading of data to an aggregation
point on the Internet. While connectivity is generally good in an urban environment, the
sensors are still not connected 100% of the time. This intermittent connectivity leads to
delay-tolerant sensing, where sensed data may be cached for a time before it is uploaded to an
aggregation point. Furthermore, the multi-hop structure of many traditional networks (such
as the Macroscope in the Redwoods and the counter-sniper system) inspired the development
of secure routing protocols, but in urban-sensing scenarios, the focus should be on securing
the data rather than securing the route.
Another facet of these new systems is their people-centric nature. Instead of trees and
birds, they are sensing people: where they are and where they are going, what they are doing
and what they are seeing. While these new aspects conjure up images of an amazing array
of applications, they also present significant security challenges. We are not aware of any
proposed people-centric urban sensing systems that incorporate security at the foundation
of their design. Systems that ignore security and privacy, or that attempt to achieve such
through security by obscurity, are inadequate and are unlikely to succeed. It is for these
reasons that we seek to lay the groundwork for security in sensor networks, specifically those
that involve mobile, people-centric sensors, by describing what we consider fundamental
challenges in the area.
Perhaps the most obvious concern is the security of the sensed data itself, especially in
correlation to the owner of the device. For example, from CarTel data it is trivial to deduce
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the location of a participant’s home within a small radius. How can this information be
protected? Additionally, is it possible to allow selected people to see personal data at high
fidelity, but to present a less accurate view to less trusted viewers?
A second critical concern is the integrity of the sensed data. An application based on
sensor data is useless if users cannot trust the accuracy or timeliness of the data it consumes.
Is it possible to operate an open, cooperative network of human-carried sensor devices when
some of the people, or some elements of the infrastructure, cannot be trusted to communicate
sensor data accurately and quickly?
In some urban-sensing visions, individual sensor nodes are dynamically tasked by remote
applications. Metrosense incorporates the idea of opportunistic tasking [6], in which a sensor
is given a task to perform for another, based upon its sensing capabilities, apparent direction,
and other attributes. In this context, a task could ask for particular sensor readings to be
gathered by sensors fulfilling certain criteria. For example, an application measuring average
temperature in a specific room could emit a task requesting temperature readings every five
minutes from sensor nodes whose GPS units indicate they are within the room. Taking this
further, nodes could inform a central authority of some of their state (e.g., location and
available hardware sensors) to facilitate better planning of tasks.
Earlier research on “retasking” static sensor networks has netted secure solutions such
as Deluge [15] and Sluice [35]. It is unclear, however, if these solutions are applicable under
the mobile paradigm where sensors are owned and operated by many different parties. How
can the sensor be sure that the incoming request is legitimate? Are such systems susceptible
to denial of service attacks, and if so, how can they be mitigated? Could a user somehow
control which third parties use her sensor for their purposes?
Another marked difference from traditional sensor networks is that urban networks are
not a carefully deployed set of trusted sensors. Just as sensors cannot categorically trust
incoming traffic, the data reported by a sensor may be unreliable because of damage or
tampering, both of which are probably more likely in the people-centric setting. Therefore,
how can the data returned by a tasked sensor be trusted? If we task personal devices to
collect sensor data for others, this raises several security and privacy risks.
It is these questions that drive our investigation and elaboration into security challenges
in mobile, people-centric urban sensor networks.
3 Applications
In this section we give a few examples of people-centric urban-sensing applications to moti-
vate that paradigm and to motivate the accompanying security challenges.
Urban data collection and processing. We anticipate that the people-centric paradigm
will encourage large-scale, on-line data collection and processing of context information re-
lated to aspects of every-day life. Such information describes not only the physical envi-
ronment but also captures some aspects of the social behavior of the people living in this
environment.
For instance, an Active Map represents the location and context of people on a geograph-
ical map. For example, students at a university can view the location of their friends on
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campus, and possibly information collected by personal and embedded sensors (indicating,
for example, that they are in a conversation or are asleep). PARCTAB [57] was one of the
seminal projects that provided users with devices whose location could be tracked and used
for enhanced communication, including an active map. More recently, companies such as
Dodgeball1 and Boost Mobile2 have started providing location-based “friend finder” services,
where users are notified of friends in the vicinity, or can view the locations of their friends
on a map. Soon we expect that sensor information in addition to location will be shared
via such services. Active Maps could also display historical information, such as a map of
the most frequently used running trails, indicating which may be muddy or contain steep
uphill sections. BikeNet [17] is one such project, aimed at cyclists who would like to share
real-time sensor data.3 The map can also be an interface for registering context-sensitive
triggers, such as “remind me to buy milk when I am next driving past the grocery store” or
“alert me when both Bob and Alice are back in the office,” or “let me know when a tennis
court is available at the park.”
Environmental monitoring at the human level. With human-centric sensing, applica-
tions that monitor the human environment (such as building maintenance, emergency rescue,
ventilation and heating) now may become more efficient and useful. It becomes possible to
sense and collect information (such as indoor air temperature) at the human level. Thus, the
environment is sensed exactly where its semantics are important: at the human, rather than
on the wall. One could optimize energy usage, for example, by reducing effort to heat, cool,
or ventilate classrooms when the classroom appears empty, or to adjust office temperature
as needed for the person sitting at the desk in the corner.
Indeed, if people carry devices that include environmental sensors, environmental moni-
toring can be achieved with far less static infrastructure. For example, people-centric devices
can monitor the environment for hazardous gases, generating alerts or collecting long-term
trends.
Towards sensing-based information systems. People-centric urban sensing may en-
courage on-line, context-aware information systems that inform, educate or entertain. Imag-
ine a context-aware publish-subscribe system; sensor information is “tagged” with attributes
as it is published into the system, and users subscribe to information based on tags of in-
terest to them. Some tags are inherent to the sensor type, or the context (location, time)
of the reading, and others may be applied by the carrier (much as tags are used on the web
today). For example, a biker may subscribe to information about bike trails and traffic con-
gestion; an allergy sufferer may subscribe to pollen-count sensors; a film-lover may subscribe
to information about the length of lines at theaters.
Discussion. Admittedly, urban sensing covers a wide range of target applications and
involves various new data dissemination components. At the core of this new setting is the





Accordingly, our study focuses on security challenges that are related to the sensing aspect of
the new second-generation sensor-networking capabilities. We next focus on the important
security challenges related to privacy, integrity and availability : addressing privacy will
allow concerned users to participate in sensing applications; providing integrity assurances
will improve the trustworthiness of sensed data; improving the availability of sensed data
will make opportunistic sensing more dependable.
4 Security Challenges
It should be clear that these applications raise serious security and privacy risks. An un-
restricted dissemination of users’ sensor data results in breaches of privacy ; users will want
to control the dissemination of information about themselves. Furthermore, since data orig-
inates from sensors that are under the control of other people, the integrity of the data
comes under question. For example, a user may tamper with a sensor device to cause it to
report false data, or misrepresent the location or time the data was sensed. Furthermore,
the availability of the infrastructure is critical for these applications to remain useful. In this
section we outline specific challenges regarding privacy, integrity, and availability.
4.1 Confidentiality and Privacy Issues
The confidentiality of sensor data goes far beyond the provision of a secure channel from the
sensor node to some gateway node. Such encryption, and in particular key distribution, has
already been well discussed in the sensor-network security literature.
Challenge 1: Context privacy
While several systems have been proposed to address location privacy [20, 26], usable mech-
anisms for context privacy have been lacking. It will be cumbersome for users to specify fine-
grained policies (as has been suggested for location privacy) for several types of context—who
should know whether they are awake, who should know whether they are in a conversation,
who should get access to heart-rate information, and so on. In a people-centric urban sensing
environment, context privacy is of high importance. As a first attempt, we have proposed
virtual walls [32] as a usable metaphor for controlling access to users’ context information.
Virtual walls behave in a way that intuitively maps to real walls in the physical world. For
example, transparent virtual walls allow the release of personal context information much as
a person’s physical actions are fully visible through a real transparent wall. We also define
intuitive semantics for translucent and opaque virtual walls. Still, for a real-world deploy-
ment, several challenges remain: users may want more precise access control for some types
of context information, and hybrid mechanisms are needed that can balance the ease of use
and a larger degree of control. There are several instances where groups of users should take
ownership over data—for example, a group of athletes may want to control access to their
sensor information as a group. Negotiation of group policies in a seamless and usable way
will be a challenge. Furthermore, it is desirable to have the negotiation preserve the privacy
of users within the group, who may want to vote on policies without being implicated or
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singled out. Lastly, an adversary may be able to infer restricted context information from
other available context information. Care must be taken, therefore, to ensure that context
is not leaked inadvertently.
We anticipate that secure multiparty computation (SMC) [22, 62] may be helpful; in SMC,
functions can be evaluated while maintaining the privacy of the individual inputs. We also
recommend exploring the use of trusted hardware for performance reasons. For example, a
trusted server can receive all the users’ inputs and compute the outcome within the aegis of
the tamper-resistant trusted hardware [50, 52].
Challenge 2: Anonymous tasking
One of the exciting aspects of the new urban-sensing paradigm is that user devices may
be opportunistically tasked to sense areas beyond the reach of the system’s infrastructure.
Tasking of users, however, can be a threat to their privacy. For example, assigning the task
“measure temperature at location X” to Alice, will eventually reveal the time at which Alice
visited location X. Furthermore, Alice may not want the system to know her location at the
instant when she was tasked. It is important, therefore, to ensure that users can be tasked
anonymously. In many cases, what is tasked is more important than who was tasked.
Delivering tasks to anonymous users may seem easy. For example, users can choose to not
identify themselves with the system, and receive tasks through beacons. Users that wish to
accept the tasks can notify the system (without revealing their identity) of their acceptance,
and then finally report the data. Such an approach, however, does not give the system any
guarantee that the user is likely to deliver on that task. It would be useful if the system could
predict which users are most likely to visit a particular location and opportunistically task
those devices specifically. Or perhaps, the system may want to task certain “reliable” classes
of people for a particular task (we call this “attribute-based” tasking). Such functionality is
at odds with anonymous tasking, and an approach that balances anonymity with location-
prediction algorithms and attribute-based tasking is needed.
One solution that looks promising is to use attribute-based authentication. Several cryp-
tographic primitives exist that allow users to prove that they possess a certain set of cre-
dentials without revealing their identity [9, 36, 45, 54]. Following such authentication, users
can be given specific tasks as long as they possess the requisite attributes. Such techniques
will interfere with approaches that rely on the users’ identities for ensuring the integrity of
sensed data. Solutions that address privacy, therefore, will need to be designed with data
integrity in mind. We discuss challenges for integrity in Section 4.2.
Another solution would to be allow the system to task specific users (i.e., knowing their
identities), without knowing their current location. This provides users with location privacy,
and not necessarily anonymity (identity privacy) [2, 24]. For example, the system may want
to task Alice, specifically, to sense a given location X. A mechanism to deliver tasks to Alice,
whose present location is hidden, could rely on an anonymizing network [2, 12, 48].
It would also be interesting to address the privacy of the querier, i.e., the person issuing
the tasks. Perhaps users will be willing to accept tasks from only certain users. This brings
up the question of what level of privacy should be supported for queriers. Perhaps techniques
from trust negotiation can be used [58, 59], in which both the querier and the user being
tasked have their own requirements of each other. Some trust negotiation techniques such
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as “hidden credentials” [4, 19, 33] address the privacy of users in trust negotiation.
Challenge 3: Anonymous data reporting
Regardless of whether tasks were delivered anonymously, users may want to report sensor
data without the system knowing their current location. For example, Alice may want to
report her personal sensor data to a trusted database, without the system knowing where
she is at the time she uploads the data. Protecting Alice’s location from the system infras-
tructure, however, can be challenging—simply identifying the wireless access point through
which she makes a network connection can localize Alice.
As mentioned earlier, one solution is to use an anonymizing network to hide Alice’s
location while she is reporting data, e.g., by bouncing data from access-point to access-point
several times before the data goes to the database. If one organization manages all the
access points, however, a system administrator may be able to correlate routing information
and infer Alice’s location. Trusted-computing hardware platforms [50, 52] may solve this
problem by ensuring that even the human operators of access points do not have access to
sensitive routing information.
If Alice is concerned about the privacy of her location at the time she collected the
sensed data, she could “fuzz” the location and time of the sensed information—to add some
random jitter, within acceptable limits. Such perturbations may make it difficult to correlate
or aggregate sensor information, however, unless the amount of error can be constrained. It
may be possible to use techniques developed for privacy-sensitive data-mining and database
queries [13, 55].
We discuss sensor-data aggregation in the following section, but briefly mention here
that due to higher connectivity (e.g., Wi-Fi enabled sensor nodes), and more energy and
bandwidth, the focus in people-centric urban sensing shifts away from in-network aggregation
and towards back-end processing of sensor data.
Another interesting problem is that of status reporting. Users in the system may be
interested in querying the status of various sensors in the network, and then make tasking
decisions based on the characteristics of available sensors. Responses to status queries,
however, can reveal enough information about the sensors’ carriers to threaten their privacy.
Such functionality appears to be at odds with anonymous tasking, and perhaps a standard
set of information can be reported to the system, e.g., location and availability of (the
anonymous) nodes.
4.2 Integrity Issues
If the system protects the privacy of the tasked nodes, using anonymizing techniques for
example, how do we know when to believe the sensor data? We discuss integrity challenges
next.
Challenge 4: Reliable data readings
Traditional sensor networks face the problem of data reliability; the literature already notes
limitations on detecting or correcting data-pollution attacks [47, 56, 61]. In people-centric
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environments, however, trustworthiness of data becomes more crucial: the adversary is no
longer only a malicious outsider capturing a subset of sensor nodes; now any participant with
an appropriately-configured device can report falsified data. Because users are in control of
their own devices, they can more easily launch such an attack. Furthermore, given the more
personal nature of applications, they have an increased interest in doing so. For instance,
privacy issues or activities that expose anomalous behavior can now be considered strong
incentives for people to perform simple data-pollution attacks to protect themselves. How
could a system detect and correct such behaviors?
One promising solution area is redundancy. In a large-scale urban-sensing infrastructure,
it may be possible to provide multiple sensor nodes with the same task. The system could
then use appropriate statistical processing algorithms to estimate the validity of the data,
or to remove polluted subsets. For instance, appropriate statistical mechanisms could detect
bias or correct malicious responses in survey data. Moreover, since incorrect data can be
introduced not only due to malicious user actions but also due to erroneous configurations of
the sensor devices, additional correction mechanisms can be considered. These mechanisms
can include the design of a dynamic process that monitors the sensing reliability of the sensor
nodes. The process can maintain various confidence levels about the quality of sensors as well
as adjust their sensing abilities. For instance, it can re-calibrate sensors with low confidence
levels or even temporarily revoke the sensed data.
Another approach, based on game-theoretic principles, is to couple strong pollution-
detection capabilities with punishment strategies (such as exclusion of misbehaving parties [1,
38]). If applied selectively, this approach could encourage fairness and provide a strong
disincentive for misbehavior. Alternatively, a reputation-based algorithm could be used as
incentive for cooperation by assigning more weight to data returned by trustworthy sensors,
perhaps determined by consensus. Finally, certain ground-truth enforcing techniques can
be used to increase the confidence level of sensed data measurements. For instance, if the
system infrastructure includes some physically secure access points with sensors of their
own (as proposed in Metrosense [6]), one can use these measurements as representative
high-weight or “ground-truth” data points that help in detecting and correcting falsification
attacks.
Challenge 5: Data authenticity
Another fundamental security problem is data authentication; that is, how can sensed data
be delivered to a database or application with assurance that no intermediate devices have
tampered with it? Furthermore, in applications that care about the identity of the user
carrying the sensor (for example, to report Alice’s location on an active map), how can the
system ensure the identity of the sensor node and its custodian?
A significant amount of research has been conducted on data authenticity in static sensor
networks, especially in the context of secure in-network data aggregation. Different threat
models have been studied, including fault-tolerant computation of aggregates [10, 25, 41, 43]
and secure aggregation in the presence of single [27, 31] or multiple [8, 47] adversarial sensor
nodes. Also, different models of in-network data aggregation have been considered, including
the star-based aggregation model [14, 39, 47] and the tree-based aggregation model [8, 61].
Aggregation of encrypted data is studied in [5, 7, 21].
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Unfortunately, these solutions are not feasible for mobile sensor networks. First, previous
authentication techniques assume the availability of a stable topological tree that spans
the network’s sensors. In a highly dynamic and mobile network no such tree structure
exists or can be maintained. At the same time, opportunistic networking, opportunistic
tasking, data muling, and delayed reporting create an inherently complex communication
environment in which few assumptions can be made about node integrity. Moreover, the
previous research using mobile sensor nodes has focused on sensors attached to animals and
vehicles. Human carriers, however, introduce new challenges for maintaining node integrity.
Namely, to authenticate a sensor node, and possibly the user carrying it, we need mechanisms
to verify identity, group memberships, and other attributes. These factors would likely
affect their access privileges and participation in protocols. Finally, this problem is made
even more challenging by the conflict between user authentication to verify data and any
potential desired anonymity of said data.
Thus we need new schemes to authenticate the user and her sensor device, and to ensure
the integrity of the data, based on few assumptions about network topology. We have some
advantages relative to existing sensor-network literature; we may assume that sensor nodes
are fairly capable platforms, and that they frequently come into direct contact with network
access points. Desired properties include computational- and bandwidth-efficient authentica-
tion, topology-independent techniques, resilience against malicious subsets of nodes and resis-
tance against denial-of-service attacks. Results on the authentication of streams in arbitrary
adversarial networks using cryptographically-enhanced error-correcting techniques [37, 42]
may give some insight in this direction.
Challenge 6: System integrity
Another important aspect of integrity relates to the functionality of the underlying system. In
principle, any operation (in addition to data collection) performed in a mobile, opportunistic,
and highly untrusted sensor network will need some form of correctness verification.
For instance, these people-centric sensor networks, likely based on pervasive devices such
as cell phones, are an application platform as well as a sensing device. These applications
need to be able to authenticate the information they receive from the system, and to deter-
mine when to trust the tasks they are asked to perform. One possible solution is to develop
task-specification languages that allow a node to verify that execution of a particular task
will not compromise the node itself. Such a procedure presents a trade-off between simplicity
of verification and flexibility in describing complex tasks. A long history of research on the
safe execution of mobile code [53] should be instructive.
Also, information centers (e.g., the server tier in MetroSense [6]) will need to validate
the integrity of actions (e.g., tasking, muling, data collection) performed by mobile nodes
at remote sites, often in a delay-tolerant fashion. How, for instance, can the system ad-
ministrator of a sensing-based information system be sure that tasking is executed correctly
or that reported data not only is authentic but also temporally relevant? Suggested solu-
tions on this front include developing efficient verification protocols that ensure secure data
management and guarantee system integrity. Conceptually, the system administrator could
maintain some secure cryptographic state of the entire system configuration, consisting of
various topological, temporal, and user-related parameters. This cryptographic state could
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be updated and used for verification as involved network nodes execute queries, tasking
commands, and other operations. This general approach recalls early results on memory
consistency checking [3].
In general, any mechanism designed for system integrity depends on the specific threat
or trust model. For instance, in an application where the focus lies on collection and off-line
fusion of sensed data, certain components of infrastructure may be considered trusted by the
system administrator—e.g., SAPs in MetroSense [6] may be considered to have higher levels
of trust, through either physical protection or the use of secure hardware.
4.3 Availability
Researchers have addressed some of the denial of service (DoS) issues for static sensor
networks—for example, adversaries may gain control of sensors and try to flood the net-
work or subvert the routing protocols to affect the network’s reporting capabilities [60].
People-centric urban sensing, however, introduces different DoS issues because devices are
already in the hands of potential adversaries. On the other hand, because we assume high
connectivity (sensors are frequently in contact with a Wi-Fi or cellular access point, and thus
multi-hop communications may rarely be needed), the sensor network itself is less susceptible
(though not entirely immune) to DoS than in some sensor-network scenarios.
Challenge 7: Preventing data suppression
In these people-centric urban sensor networks, DoS attacks that limit the availability of data
becomes one of the central concerns. Since users get tasked opportunistically, these users may
configure their device to refuse to accept certain tasks, or accept but then ignore the tasks.
(Contrast this behavior with “traditional” sensor networks, where installed sensors faithfully
report data unless compromised by an external adversary.) Data-consuming applications are
left at the mercy, and whims, of the individual participants. This problem is exacerbated
by privacy concerns—if users feel unable to control access to their data, they will be loathe
to carry the device, or permit tasks that report such sensor data. This effect reinforces the
importance of the privacy challenges above.
Challenge 8: Participation
Unlike static sensor networks, where sensors are embedded in the infrastructure, people-
centric urban sensing relies on the sensor devices carried by users. One of the major chal-
lenges today is to create incentives for users to carry such devices, especially if bulky or a
threat to their privacy. The best approach is to incorporate the sensors into a device they
want to carry (such as a cell phone or music player), and provide incentives that are com-
patible with users’ needs and interests. If the device has applications with clear direct and
indirect benefits for the user, has usable, strong measures that protect privacy, and is easy
to carry, people will use it.
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Challenge 9: Fairness
Many people-centric sensor applications provide direct benefits to the users who carry the
sensor nodes. Thus, people have an incentive to cheat, to obtain better service for themselves
than they fairly deserve. For example, users may cause the applications to task many other
sensors to collect information for their own needs, without being willing to take on tasks
for other users. Research on incentive-compatible peer-to-peer systems may provide useful
insight here [18, 23].
5 Summary
In this paper we recognize the current interest in people-centric urban-sensing applications
and infrastructure. Such applications have clear and substantial security and privacy chal-
lenges, which must be resolved if these systems have any hope of realizing their potential.
We described 9 challenges, and offered conceptual solution approaches for each one.
Challenge 1: Context privacy
Challenge 2: Anonymous tasking
Challenge 3: Anonymous data reporting
Challenge 4: Reliable data readings
Challenge 5: Data authenticity
Challenge 6: System integrity
Challenge 7: Preventing data suppression
Challenge 8: Participation
Challenge 9: Fairness
We hope that this paper will create a substantive discussion around these challenges and
encourage all researchers involved with urban-sensing and people-centric sensor networks
to address security and privacy at a fundamental level within their system and application
design. The future of the paradigm depends on it.
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